I am sorry, but the dis-allowance of being able cutting and pasting of passwords is security measure.  

I will claim that this restriction does NOT improve security. In fact, it will make it worse and will lead to

• User temporarily change the password to a simpler/shorter string to type.
• and will cause user endless frustration (imagining having to type blindly 64 random characters that just echoing '*****'. If user makes a mistake, how does s/he figure out which is the bad characters?)

The NIST Digital Identity guideline called this out

Verifiers SHOULD permit claimants to use “paste” functionality when entering a memorized
secret. This facilitates the use of password managers, which are widely used and in many cases
increase the likelihood that users will choose stronger memorized secrets.

I just came here to complain about the exact same thing, and it's also because of Wealthfront. I will check out your solution, thanks.

Not allowing pasting of a password is just plain stupid and removes the utility of import of data. This worked fine last year.

Sarcasm ON: "Yes, Of Course I like manually typing my 16+ digit password consisting of a random jumble of caps, normal letters, numbers and symbols." And I don't feel like turning off the sarcasm. This is just plain stupid.

And BAD for security.

I don't think it did work previously, given tax2019-iinnttuuiitt's comment. In any event, their solution worked great for me. I highly recommend checking it out!

The import worked fine last year, before Wealthfront went to the app-specific password.      Unfortunately, I am not all that tech savvy and I am extremely reluctant to download a solution that I know nothing about,  especially when I am using to access my tax software.  

I'm sorry but this is so wrong as expressed by all the other folks posting. We are forever told by the security experts to make our passwords long and unrecognizable so everyone uses password managers to do this. So to now have to manually enter a long unrecognizable password without an error is extremely unworkable. Please rethink what you are doing here.

Not allowing pasting is not "security" in any way. I have the password in a vault on the pc, so I have control of it. Do you think the ruskies are going to steal it as I move the mouse across the screen?

Next, the password is 20 random characters. My wife read it to me as I typed it. We failed the first time by either her misreading the garbage string or my mistyping it. I refuse to feel guilty if I mistyped it and I don't blame her at all if it was her glitch. WE SHOULDN'T HAVE HAD TO DO THIS!

The same bozo appears to have thought that not showing the password was another security requirement. Since I couldn't see the **bleep** thing we just had to start the entire transcription effort all over again. So, it only took two times, but I AM PISSED OFF!

If you want to not show the password since you think your customers are so stupid as to do their taxes in a Starbucks, then put in a radio button to suppress the view.

That's two extremely stupid decisions in the same place!

Exactly. It's one poor decision made even worse by another poor decision. If you could at least see what you're typing, not being able to paste it in would be at least bearable. 

add me to the list who are disgusted by this implementation.   You either allow cut and paste OR allow us to see what we've entered.    I picked a very secure password for my brokerage account...  25 characters for security reasons.  Now I've entered it 3 times with no success so you've forced me to go to my account change the password to the barest minimum requirements and I still have not way of verifying if i entered it correctly.    THIS SUCKS

oh and after you get the message that the user name or password is incorrect it directs you to "verify it".  how the @#$@#$@ can you do that when you can't SEE what you entered?

Thank you for the workaround "entertext".    I was able to use it and it will save me a lot of work.   No thanks to Intuit however.   

With respect, installing a tool from a public form -- a tool specifically designed to cut and paste passwords -- sounds like a bad idea.  

Well, in the case of Wealthfront (which is what the tool was originally posted as the workaround for), the generated password that you need to paste is only valid for TurboTax, and can immediately be revoked, so there's basically zero exposure.

Using it for a brokerage login, you could have a valid point, but that would assume that the app is also able to access your login userid, which it's not clear that it can.

Also, the source code is available.